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Insurance for the Commission
of Intentional Torts
By DONALD F. FABSTE*
FRANCIS J. STnLmm*
I. Coverage For Intentional Torts Under Older Policy Forms
A. The Concept of Accidental Injury
LIABILITY insurance policies are written in many forms. Among
the most common are the following: (1) The automobile policy,
which affords coverage for losses arising out of the use of cer-
tain classes of automobiles; (2) The comprehensive liability policy,
applicable to a broad range of risks other than those connected with
automobiles; (3) The fire policy or homeowner's policy covering
various home and family risks; and (4) The owner's, landlord's and
tenant's policy, covering various risks connected with certain desig-
nated commercial premises. Although they vary as to the risks which
are insured, virtually all such policies contain the same provisions
regarding the kind of injury or harm insured by the policy. In par-
ticular, most liability insurance policies issued prior to 1966 contain
identical language applicable to the intentional tort liability of the
insured.'
The older standard policy forms typically obligate the insurer
to pay on behalf of the insured such sums as the insured shall be-
come obligated to pay for "bodily injury or property damage caused
* Member, San Mateo Bar
See, e.g., NATIONAL BUREAU OF CASUALTY UNDERWlrrERs, STANDARD PRoVI-
SIONS FOR GENERAL LTABIn.Ty POLICIES (1935) [hereinafter cited as STANDARD
.A TY POLICY OF 1935]. The policy clauses quoted in the text concerning
accidental injury and intended harm were in common use long before 1935.
The term "standard" has been used for want of a better one to reflect the
similarity of the language used in most policies, although originally there was
no single source of policy texts. In 1966 a new standard policy was issued
containing certain changes in wording although not in philosophy. NA-
TIONAL BUREAU OF CASUALTY UNDERWRITERS, STANDARD PROVISIONS FOR GENERAL
IABmrTY POLICIES (1966) [hereinafter cited as STANDARD LIABILITY POLICY OF
1966]. Policies with similar language may be found in E. PATTERSON & W.
YOUNG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAw OF INSURANCE, app. I, at 647-97 (4th
ed. 1967).
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by accident.",2 As a corollary, the policy contains an express exclu-
sion of coverage for injuries "intentionally caused by the insured."3
Most coverage questions in connection with intentional torts involve
interpretation of the quoted phrases.
By limiting the covered claims to those for "bodily injury or prop-
erty damage," the Standard policy excludes (or was once thought to
exclude) coverage for most of the intentional torts. Under a re-
strictive interpretation of the policy language, battery and trespass
are the only torts clearly within the scope of the coverage, because
these are the only intentional torts which result in "bodily injury" or
"property damage."4 Such torts as assault and false arrest, which in-
volve primarily mental anguish rather than physical harm, and defa-
mation and invasion of privacy, which may cause pecuniary loss but
which do not involve damage to property,5 would all be excluded by
the nature of the policy. Questions such as whether a false arrest
could give rise to a "bodily injury" within the meaning of a liability
insurance policy never seem to have been litigated, probably because
the "accident" and "intentional injury" clauses of the policy furnish a
surer ground for refusing coverage.
The old standard policy states that its application is confined to
damage "caused by accident." The policy does not define "accident";
however, the courts furnished the following definition at an early
date: "[A] casualty-something out of the usual course of events,
and which happens suddenly and unexpectedly, and without any de-
sign on the part of the person injured."6 Many modern cases have
adhered to essentially the same definition.7 "Accident" and the ju-
dicial interpretations surrounding it became the source of much liti-
gation.8 The term became, in fact, so buried in a quagmire of ju-
dicial verbiage that the insurance industry abandoned it with the
issuance of the new policy forms in 1966, substituting in its place the
term "occurrence." 9
2 STANDARD LIABILITY PoLIcY or 1935, supra note 1.
3 Id.
4 See generally W. PRossEP, HANDBOOK oF TE LAw or TORTS §§ 9,
13, 14 (3d ed. 1964).
5 See generally id. §§ 10, 12, 106-08, 112.
6 Richards v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 89 Cal. 170, 175, 26 P. 762, 763 (1891).
7 E.g., Zuckerman v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, 42 Cal. 2d 460, 473, 267
P.2d 777, 784 (1954).
8 E.g., Moore v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 140 Cal. App. 2d 957, 295 P.2d 154
(1956); Ritchie v. Anchor Cas. Co., 135 Cal. App. 2d 245, 286 P.2d 1000 (1955);
Farmers Elevator Mut. Ins. Co. v. Burch, 38 IM. App. 2d 249, 187 N.E.2d 12
(1962); Henderson v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 262 Mass. 522, 160 N.E. 415 (1928);
Rex Roofing Co. v. Lumber Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 280 App. Div. 665, 116 N.Y.S.2d
876 (1952).
9 STA=DABD LIA~mITY PoLIcY or 1966, supra note 1.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [VoL 20
The problem with the use of the word "accident" was its ambig-
uity with respect to two major issues. Courts and lawyers were
never able to disabuse themselves of the notion that an event must
happen "suddenly" in order to be an accident, thus producing un-
ending argument over whether gradual processes such as erosion and
leakage could give rise to an accident. 10 This particular ambiguity
had little bearing on the area of intentional torts, most of which tend
to happen suddenly enough. The other major ambiguity, however,
produced a crucial issue in resolving coverage for intentional torts.
The pre-1966 policy leaves unresolved the question whether the
event should be viewed from the aspect of the insured or the aspect
of the victim in determining whether an accident has occurred. Some
courts adopted the view expressed in the definition quoted above,
and borrowed from cases interpreting accident policies, that one
looked at the event from the point of view of the injured person and
asked whether he had been in an accident. 1 Such an interpretation
makes sense in the area of accident insurance, since under an accident
policy the injured person is himself the insured. It is undoubtedly
contrary to the underwriting intent of the liability policy, which
seeks to distinguish between harm that the insured intended to in-
flict and harm caused by him inadvertently.
The popularity of this interpretation is understandable, however,
in view of the fact that the issue was frequently presented in early
cases where the insured was sued for a battery committed by his
agent in which the insured did not participate. Some early cases
held that such an injury was not accidental on the argument that it
was intended by the person causing the harm.12 But most courts were
more anxious to allow coverage in such situations. Viewing the issue
of accidental injury from the standpoint of the injured person was
the convenient way to uphold coverage, and the leading decisions
soon took this approach.13 In addition, the insurance industry seems
to have decided that coverage should be available for injuries re-
sulting from battery by an agent. Most standard policies issued
10 Geddes & Smith, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 51 Cal. 2d 558,
334 P.2d 881 (1959).
"1 E.g., New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Jones, 135 F.2d 191 (6th Cir. 1943);
Georgia Cas. Co. v. Alden Mills, 156 Miss. 853, 127 So. 555 (1930); Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co. v. Wolbarst, 95 N.H. 40, 57 A.2d 151 (1948); Fox Wis.
Corp. v. Century Indem. Co., 219 Wis. 523, 6 N.W.2d 708 (1942). "Injuries are
accidental or the opposite for the purpose of indemnity according to the
quality of the results rather than the quality of the causes." Messersmith v.
American Fidelity Co., 232 N.Y. 161, 165, 133 N.E. 432, 433 (1921) (Cardozo, J.).
12 E.g., Commonwealth Cas. Co. v. Headers, 118 Ohio St. 429, 161 N.E.
278 (1928).
13 Georgia Cas. Co. v. Alden Mills, 156 Miss. 853, 127 So. 555 (1930).
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during the last thirty years have contained a clause providing that
"assault and battery shall be deemed an accident unless committed
by or at the direction of the named insured."'14
Coverage for the intentional wrong of an agent was the earliest
form of insurance for intentional tort liability to receive judicial recog-
nition. As indicated, the major obstacle to such coverage was re-
moved either by judicial acceptance of the principle that the "acci-
dent" was to be viewed from the standpoint of the injured person or
by an express clause in the policy. That principle did not, however,
resolve those cases in which the insured was sued on an intentional
tort theory predicated on the assertion that he personally committed
the act causing the harm. Such situations pose the most difficult
problems in connection with insurance for intentional torts.
B. The Intentional Injury Exclusion
1. Judicial Treatment of Questions of Intent
The most significant language of the old policy form concerning
insurance for intentional torts is the clause providing that the insur-
ance did not apply to "injuries, loss or damage ... intentionally
caused by the insured."' 5 The meaning of this language is crucial to
the question of the scope of coverage for intentional torts. The
standard liability policy is designed to indemnify the insured for
damage which he causes inadvertently, negligently, even recklessly.
It is not intended to protect him from the legal consequences of
harm which he intentionally inflicts.
The significant factor in the clause as it appeared in the pre-1966
policy is its reference to "injury" that is intentionally caused. Al-
though sometimes referred to loosely, and very inaccurately, as the
"intentional act exclusion," the clause focuses not on the intent to
act but on the intent to injure. The better reasoned decisions would
thus require that the insured specifically intend the particular harm
that is the basis of the claim before the exclusionary clause applied.
The case of Morrill v. Gallagher6 is illustrative. The insured
and a companion, both evidently adults, threw a "cherry bomb" fire-
cracker into a room, intending to frighten a girl. The explosion re-
sulted in deafness, for which she sued. Having intended an invasion
of the plaintiff's interest in personal security, the insured was clearly
liable for some form of intentional tort, either the intentional infliction
14 STANDARD LIABILITY POLICY OF 1935, supra note 1.
15 Id. This clause usually appears in the policy listed under "Exclu-
sions." The list of exclusions is lengthy and ordinarily situated at the end
of the policy. One of the improvements in the new form was to put the
analogous language in a more prominent place.
16 370 Mlich. 578, 122 N.W.2d 687 (1963).
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of mental distress, assault, or perhaps battery. Such liability would
naturally include any unforeseen consequences of the act. The court
held that coverage was afforded, stating: "[I]t will be noted that
under the language of the excluding clause the injury must be caused
'intentionally.' There is nothing in this case to justify a conclusion
that either Gallagher or Canfield intended to cause any physical
harm to plaintiff.11 7 Another example is Connecticut Indemnity
Company v. Nestor.18 Coverage was afforded where a boy set a fire
to frighten the inhabitants of a house, and the fire spread accidently,
thus damaging the house. Similarly, in Baldinger v. Consolidated
Mutual Insurance Company,19 the insured, age six, shoved a little
girl to the ground, causing a surprisingly severe fracture of her elbow.
The court found him to be capable of understanding that his act
caused an offensive bodily contact to the plaintiff and that he thus
possessed the mental capacity requisite to commit battery, but it
further held that he had not intended to inflict injury on the plaintiff.
Coverage was held to be available.
The clause excluding intentionally inflicted harm thus poses two
difficult and related problems: The need to discover and prove the
subjective intent of the insured and the question of when the result-
ing harm exceeds the scope of the insured's intentions. The law of
most jurisdictions includes a doctrine that persons must be held to
intend the usual and ordinary consequences of their voluntary acts.20
Few courts and fewer insurance companies would be receptive to the
plea that "I intended to hit him in the face but I did not intend to
fracture his jaw."2 1  On the other hand, a point is reached where
the harm done substantially exceeds that intended. At that un-
certain point, coverage arises. In many instances, isolating that point
is complicated by the fact that the evidence of intent must be drawn
from observation of the external act, leaving the ultimate problem in
the hands of the trier of fact, with no easily applied test available to
facilitate its task.
One case indicating the difficulty in applying the exclusion is
Wigginton v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company,2 2 in which a
taxicab blocked the way of the insured, who was parked at a curb.
17 Id. at 588, 122 N.W.2d at 691.
18 4 Mich. App. 578, 145 N.W.2d 399 (1966).
10 15 App. Div. 2d 526, 222 N.Y.S.2d 736 (1961), aff'g 11 App. Div. 2d 47,
201 N.Y.S.2d 632 (1960).
20 CAL. Evm. CoDE § 665.
21 See Pendergraft v. Commercial Standard Fire & Marine Co., 342 F.2d
427 (10th Cir. 1965), where the insured, a minor of unspecified age, struck the
claimant on the cheek, causing him to fall and fracture his skull on the pave-
ment. Coverage was denied.
22 169 So. 2d 170 (La. App. 1964).
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The insured intentionally backed his auto into the cab, injuring the
driver who was standing at an open door of his vehicle. The court
denied coverage because there was "no question ... that the injury
was caused intentionally." 23 The result may be correct; however, the
opinion is deficient in failing to explore the possibility that the real
intent was to inflict minor property damage to the cab, not major
bodily injury to the driver.24
The Wigginton case should be contrasted with CruUl v. Gleb.2 .5
In that case, the claimant and the insured became involved in a dis-
pute over a ditch dividing their lands. The claimant entered his car
and began to back up. The insured, in a pickup truck, repeatedly
rammed the claimant's car head-on, ultimately forcing it from the
roadway and causing personal injuries to the claimant. The court
found the evidence consistent with an "intent to do the act, knowing
it was wrong, but no conscious intent to inflict or cause the harm
that followed. '26 The court characterized the conduct of the insured
as "wanton" rather than intentional with respect to the injuries sus-
tained by the claimant. Such cases make it clear that the issue is
really one of degree, and that any effort to erect a verbal boundary
line between intentional and negligent conduct can achieve only
limited success.
Another troublesome type of case in applying the intentional in-
jury exclusion is that in which the insured intends to injure a par-
ticular victim and manages, in the course of carrying out that intent,
to harm other victims as well. In Kraus v. Allstate Insurance Com-
pany,27 the insured stole a quantity of dynamite and used it to con-
vert his automobile into a bomb, apparently for the purpose of
doing away both with himself and with his wife. He set off the blast
while parked with his wife on a public street, blasting a number of
innocent pedestrians in the process. The court held that there was
no coverage for the injured pedestrians. It argued that the injuries
did not result from the use of the auto and were thus outside the
scope of the auto policy, but was not satisfied to rest on that ground
alone. It applied a theory of "transferred intent" to the coverage
question, holding that since the injury was intentional as to the wife,
it would be deemed intentional as to the other victims as well. This
23 Id. at 171.
24 Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Ratliff, 242 F. Supp. 983 (E.D. Ark. 1965), shows
better reasoning on similar facts. The court recognized the distinction be-
tween intent to damage the car and intent to harm the occupant but found, on
a showing of repeated bumping resulting from a standing feud between the
parties, that harm to the occupant was intended.
25 382 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. App. 1964).
26 Id. at 22.
27 258 F. Supp. 407 (D. Pa. 1966), aff'd, 379 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1966).
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reasoning applied fiction as a mode of analysis instead of confronting
the facts. It may be that the insured intended to injure his wife and
anyone else unlucky enough to be in the vicinity of the blast. The
facts were certainly subject to such an interpretation. But there is
no language in the standard liability policy which would dictate the
creation of a "transferred intent" fiction where the insured intends
harm to one person and accidently injures someone else. The true
basis of the decision is undoubtedly the normal visceral reaction
that it is unfair to compel the insurer to cover the consequences of
such a bizzare occurrence.
A sounder approach to this type of problem is illustrated by
American Insurance Company v. Saulnier,28 in which a boy threw a
soda pop bottle into a swimming pool, intending to either strike or
frighten a girl. A small boy named David suddenly emerged from
the water directly in the path of the bottle, was struck by it and in-
jured. The court declined to apply the "transferred intent" theory
urged upon it. Even if the boy had intended to hit the girl, which
the judge doubted, he had not intended to hit David. As to David,
there was no intent to cause injury. Coverage was allowed.
The result in the Saulnier case is wholly consistent with the
objectives of the liability policy. Even if the insured intended harm,
he did not intend serious bodily harm to anyone and the injury
done to the innocent victim was wholly accidental from the insured's
standpoint, being the consequence of his mistake, not his design. The
Kraus case is distinguishable in the sense that an act of extreme vio-
lence was deliberately directed at one victim. In the light of that
fact, one is far less inclined to view the numerous resulting injuries
as accidental. However, if it is accepted that the injury to pedestrians
was unintended in Kraus, the terms of the policy compel coverage in
that situation as well.
29
2. Insanity and Intent
Cases such as Kraus suggest a further question as to whether
insanity might vitiate the intent required to bring the exclusion
into play. Few cases thus far have dealt with the question of mental
capacity, but their number may well increase. The New Jersey case
of Ruvolo v. American Casualty Company30 is likely to be an influ-
ential decision. The insured, a doctor, shot and killed his professional
28 242 F. Supp. 257 (D. Conn. 1965).
29 See Smith v. Moran, 61 IlM. App. 2d 157, 209 N.E.2d 18 (1965), where
the insured fired several shots at A and one of the bullets struck B. The
court had no difficulty in holding that the injury to B was unintended and
that the policy applied.
80 39 N.J. 490, 189 A.2d 204 (1963).
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associate. He was certified by court psychiatrists as unfit to stand
trial and was committed to a mental institution. The wrongful death
claim of the victim's heirs resulted in coverage litigation over whether
the death was intentional within the meaning of a liability policy.
"Broadly stated, [the court said,] if the actor does not have the
mental capacity to do the act intentionally, the policy coverage remains
operative."31 The court had
no doubt that if a homicidal act of an insured is of such character
as to excuse him from criminal responsibility because of insanity,
i.e., because at the time of its commission he did not have the
mental capacity to understand the nature and quality of his act or
to be able to distinguish between right and wrong with respect
to it, the killing should not be considered "intentional" within the
meaning of the defendant's policy.
32
This decision creates a distinction between the effect of insanity
upon liability and the effect of insanity upon coverage. The insured's
insanity would not relieve him from liability for the tort of battery.
This is an ancient rule which is said to rest on a public policy of
preferring to compensate the victim rather than to exonerate a person
not responsible for his acts.33 The decision in favor of coverage is
really an expression of the same policy, recognizing that the respon-
sibility of the insane person for his torts is really a matter of strict
liability and not of intent, and is thus the type of risk for which
coverage is not excluded under the liability policy.
In suggesting that standards of intent derived from the criminal
law are applicable in interpreting a liability insurance policy, the
court in Ruvolo may have opened up many coverage problems. New
,Jersey evidently applies the traditional right-wrong test of criminal
responsibility.34 One might ask how the coverage problem will be
approached in jurisdictions applying the Durham or "product" ap-
proach where responsibility is determined with reference to whether
the defendant's act was the product of a mental disease or defect.85
A further question is whether insanity under the criminal law is the
only mental state which will be recognized as a lack of capacity to
formulate the required intent. Some jurisdictions, including Califor-
nia, have developed a doctrine of diminished capacity, concerning con-
duct falling short of insanity, which does not fully exonerate the
defendant from guilt, but which does reduce the gravity of the of-
fense.38 Possibly a similar doctrine, based upon a diminished ca-
31 Id. at 496-97, 189 A.2d at 208.
32 Id. at 498, 189 A.2d at 208.
33 See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF HE LAW OF TORTS 1028-29 (3d ed. 1964).
See also CAL. Civ. CODE § 41.
34 State v. Lucas, 30 N.J. 37, 152 A.2d 50 (1959).
35 Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
36 See, e.g., People v. Gorshen, 51 Cal. 2d 716, 336 P.2d 492 (1959); People
v. Wells; 33 Cal. 2d 330, 202 P.2d 53 (1949).
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pacity to formulate the intent to inflict injury, will be advanced in
situations similar to that in the Kraus case.
Decisions concerning fire insurance policies, which typically ex-
clude coverage for the incendiary acts of the insured, have long
held that coverage is available if the insured is insane at the time
he causes the fire.37 These cases furnish a ready analogy where the
same question is presented under a liability policy. Such an approach
was suggested in Rosa v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company,38 in
which the insured, a 16 year old boy, forced a girl into a car and
shot her. He was committed to a mental hospital following a plea of
nolo contendere in the criminal prosecution. The evidence showed
that he was the victim of a severe mental illness diagnosed as schiz-
ophrenia.3 9 The court explained the decision in favor of coverage as
follows:
[A]II his activities leading up to the attack on the plaintiff, and
the attack itself, are traceable exclusively to the impairment of his
judgment and rational capacity by the influence of schizophrenia.
This derangement of his intellect deprived him of the ability to
govern his conduct in accordance with reason and intent, to judge
the nature, character and consequences of his act and to resist im-
pulses to do other than what he did.
Under these circumstances, his action cannot be regarded as
"intentional" within the meaning of an insurance contract.
40
The authorities cited by the court in support of this holding were
Ruvolo, a Connecticut case defining criminal insanity and an anno-
tation dealing with insanity as a defense to coverage under a fire
policy.4
1
Although the Ruvolo and Rosa cases are the only ones located
in which insanity was advanced as a means of avoiding the intentional
injury exclusion, there is no risk in predicting that their number will
increase. Examples can readily be located in which the point might
well have prevailed had anyone thought to bring it up. In United
Services Automobile Association v. Wharton,42 the insured swerved
his auto into an oncoming truck, thereby killing his wife. In a cover-
age suit brought by the wife's administrator against the husband's
policy the wife's dying declarations were admitted, showing that the
insured was attempting to commit suicide when he caused the accident
and that he had stated "[wIe will go to eternity together" 43 just
37 E.g., Hier v. Farmers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 104 Mont. 471, 67 P.2d 831
(1937).
38 243 F. Supp. 407 (D. Conn. 1965).
39 Id. at 408.
40 Id. at 409.
41 Ruvolo v. American Cas. Co., 39 N.J. 490, 189 A.2d 204 (1963); State v.
Donahue, 141 Conn. 656, 109 A.2d 364 (1954); Annot., 110 A.L.R. 1060 (1937).
42 237 F. Supp. 255 (W.D.N.C. 1965).
43 Id. at 257.
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prior to the collision. A prosecution against him was dismissed on
stipulation that he make certain reparations to the wife's heirs. He
later committed suicide in a mental hospital. The court treated the
case as one involving an intentional injury and denied coverage.
Evidently the argument that the insured's insanity might render the
killing unintentional was never raised.
From the foregoing it is apparent that the problem of fathoming
human intent is no easier in connection with the interpretation of
liability insurance policies than in the fields of tort and crime where
it is more commonly encountered. Many recent cases have not hesi-
tated to pursue the inquiry into the subjective intent of the insured to
the ultimate extent possible for the exploration of mental capacity.
44
Although the insurance industry has generally tried to resist such
refinement of the inquiry, the better reasoned cases have clearly
demonstrated that this inquiry is compelled by the terms of the pol-
icy, and that no simplistic approach can be substituted for a close
analysis of the facts to determine what, in reality, the insured in-
tended when he committed the act giving rise to the claim.
C. The Duty to Defend
The foregoing discussion has treated the extent of coverage for
intentional torts from the standpoint of the insurer's duty to
indemnify the insured in the event he is held liable. This obligation
is commonly referred to as the "duty to pay" and is expressed in the
insuring agreement by that clause whereby the insurer promises "to
pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become
legally obligated to pay as damages [because of bodily injury or
property damage].' 45 In addition to this basic duty, the insurer
under most liability policies promises to "defend any suit alleging
such bodily injury or property damage and seeking damages which
are payable under the terms of this policy, even if any of the alle-
gations of the suit are groundless, false or fraudulent. '46 This obli-
gation is commonly referred to as the "duty to defend."
This latter clause-the duty to defend-furnishes one of the ma-
jor benefits of liability insurance since it protects the insured not
merely from exposure to liability, but also from the costs of investi-
gation and legal counsel which are necessarily attendant to all liti-
gation. This duty of the insurer is distinguishable from and broader
than the duty to pay in several respects. The duty to defend arises
44 E.g., Rosa v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 243 F. Supp. 407 (D. Conn. 1965);
Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Ratliff, 242 F. Supp. 983 (E.D. Ark. 1965); Ruvolo v.
American Cas. Co., 39 N.J. 490, 189 A.2d 204 (1963).
45 STA=AnRw IABniTY PoLicy oF 1935, supra note 1.
46 Id.
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when suit is brought against the insured, not when the legal obli-
gation of the insured matures.47 Further, the language of the de-
fense clause clearly states that the insured is entitled to a defense
in cases where he is not and never will be obligated to pay, i.e., in cases
where the suit is "groundless, false or fraudulent."48  The extent to
which the duty to defend is broader than the duty to pay creates
problems in many areas of insurance coverage. In no area is liti-
gation of the issue more common than that of intentional torts.
The major dispute over the meaning of the defense clause is
created by the invariable presence of conflicting accounts as to the
nature of the facts. In the typical case the insured is sued for assault
and battery and the complaint alleges that he intended to inflict the
injuries which the plaintiff claims to have suffered. The insured
tenders the complaint to his insurance carrier for a defense and the
carrier takes the position that there is no coverage and hence no
duty to defend because of the allegation of intentional injury.
The insured, however, contends that the suit is really one for some-
thing other than an intentionally inflicted injury. Typically he takes
one or more of the following positions:
(1) His act was privileged and thus not wrongful, i.e., he acted
in self defense.
49
(2) The blow was unintended, i.e., he was merely negligent or
was not at fault at all.50
(3) He did not commit the act charged, i.e., someone else struck
the blow.51
(4) He intended only a minor bodily contact, not a major injury
such as is alleged to have resulted.
52
Under such circumstances the defense clause presents a difficult
problem of interpretation. The issue is simply stated: If the insured
denies the intentional infliction of injury, does the claim become one
for "bodily injury," some of the allegations of which are "groundless,
false or fraudulent," and thus a claim covered by the defense clause,
or does it remain a claim for intentional, not accidental, injury and
thus not a claim "damages for which are payable under the terms of
47 Firco, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 173 Cal. App. 2d 524, 527,
343 P.2d 311, 313 (1959).
48 STANDARD LIABIInIY POLICY or 1935, supra note 1.
49 See Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr.
104 (1966); Walters v. American Ins. Co., 185 Cal. App. 2d 776, 8 Cal. Rptr.
665 (1960).
50 See Morrill v. Gallagher, 370 Mich. 578, 122 N.W.2d 687 (1963).
51 See Wilson v. Maryland Cas. Co., 377 Pa. 588, 105 A.2d 304 (1954).
52 See Baldinger v. Consolidated Mut. Ins. Co., 15 App. Div. 2d 526, 222
N.Y.S.2d 736 (1961).
May 1969] INTENTIONAL TORT INSURAN CE 1229
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
this policy?" The answer to this question is not clearly evident from
the language of the policy. In interpreting the defense clause, the
courts initially developed certain basic rules. These have been sub-
ject to evolution, refinement and change as more and more litigation
has arisen in connection with the defense of intentional tort claims.
It has long been recognized that the duty to defend must be
tested against the allegations of the complaint and not against the
ultimate outcome of the action.53 In other words, if the complaint
states a claim that is covered, the insurer may not refuse to defend
on the assertion that other facts not alleged would indicate that
there is no coverage. 54 The courts have been tormented by the more
difficult question whether the duty to defend will arise in a case
where the allegations of the complaint, if all of them were proven,
would defeat coverage, but where information is presented to the
insurer indicating that the true facts of the claim show it to be within
the coverage of the policy. A vast body of cases has grown up around
this question and the decisions in various jurisdictions are utterly
inconsistent. 55
The older, restrictive solution to the problem is illustrated by
Wilson v. Maryland Casualty Company.5 In a coverage suit against
his insurer the insured, a bar owner, alleged that the insurer had
refused to defend a suit for battery in which the claimant had pleaded
that the act was committed by the insured personally. The insured
further alleged that the claim resulted from an attack by patrons of
his bar in which he had not participated and that following the
refusal of the insurer to defend, he had settled the claim for business
reasons. The court held that no cause of action had been stated
for breach of the policy. "The question is not as to the truth or
falsity of a claim, but whether it is covered by the policy; if it is, the
Company must defend it, if it is not, its truth or falsity is wholly
immaterial."57 The court believed that "the rule everywhere is that
the obligation of a casualty insurance company to defend an action
53 Greer-Robbins Co. v. Pacific Sur. Co., 37 Cal. App. 540, 174 P. 110
(1918).
54 Lee v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 178 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1949) (New York
law); Lamb v. Belt Cas. Co., 3 Cal. App. 2d 624, 40 P.2d 311 (1935); Mission-
aries of the Company of Mary, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 155 Conn. 104,
230 A.2d 21 (1967). See generally Annot., 50 A.L.R.2d 458 (1956).
55 Compare Goldberg v. Lumber Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 297 N.Y. 148, 77 N.E.
2d 131 (1948) (allegations of complaint are determinative of insurer's duty to
defend), with Inter-State Oil Co. v. Bland, 354 Mo. 622, 190 S.W.2d 227 (1945)
(facts which came to attention of insurer outside allegations in complaint
must be taken into consideration in determining duty to defend). See gener-
ally Annot., 50 A.L.R.2d 458 (1956).
56 377 Pa. 588, 105 A.2d 304 (1954) (Musmanno, J.).
57 Id. at 592, 105 A.2d at 306.
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brought against the insured is to be determined solely by the alle-
gations of the complaint in the action, and that the company is not
required to defend if it would not be bound to indemnify the in-
sured even though the claim against him should prevail in that
action." 8
The decision is unsatisfactory in several respects and represents
an approach to the problem that is falling into disfavor. The court's
basic argument is that if the claimant had prevailed on the theory
stated in the original complaint there would be no coverage; hence,
there was no duty to defend. This argument equates the duty to
defend with the duty to pay, and fails to account for the possibility
that the claim may involve facts other than those stated in the alle-
gations. Suppose, for example, the allegation that the insured per-
sonally committed the battery is false, as the insured contended in
the Wilson case. In that event, although the insured might not be
liable at all, on any theory, he has been deprived of the protection
of the policy by the erroneous version of the facts asserted by the
claimant. Further, under the version of the facts stated by the in-
sured, he might be liable on a theory of recovery for which coverage
would clearly be available, such as a negligent failure to protect a
business visitor from unruly patrons. As one dissenting justice stated:
"It is to me an amazing thing that an insurance company, being sued
on a contract of insurance, can summarily escape liability by simply
asserting, through hearsay, that the insured is lying."5 9
In spite of its obvious deficiencies many decisions continue to
repeat the formula that "if the complaint tendered to an insurance
company does not allege the happening of an event covered by the
policy, there is no duty to defend."160 However, there are also many
decisions of recent date recognizing that the insured should be given
the benefit of a dispute over the facts giving rise to the claim and
that the duty to defend must be imposed whenever facts from any
source are disclosed to the insurer indicating the possibility of cover-
age.6
1
Perhaps the broadest interpretation of the defense clause articu-
lated to date is the decision of the Supreme Court of California in
58 Id. at 594, 105 A.2d at 307.
59 Id. at 599, 105 A.2d at 308.
60 Consolidated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ivy Liquors, Inc., 185 So. 2d 187 (Fla.
App.), cert. denied, 189 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1966); Massachusetts Turnpike Au-
thority v. Perini Corp., 349 Mass. 448, 208 N.E.2d 807 (1965); see Ohio Cas.
Ins. Co. v. Flanagin, 44 N.J. 504, 512, 210 A.2d 221, 225 (1965).
61 Pendlebury v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 89 Idaho 456, 464, 406 P.2d
129, 134 (1965); Crum v. Anchor Cas. Co., 264 Minn. 378, 387-88, 119 N.W.2d
703, 709 (1963); Mavar Shrimp & Oyster Co. v. United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co., 187 So. 2d 871, 874 (Miss. 1966).
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Gray v. Zurich Insurance Company.62 Although this decision has
been condemned by many writers purporting to speak for the insur-
ance industry,6 3 it is likely to outlive the words of its critics and it
probably represents what will, in time, become the generally accepted
approach to those duty to defend cases alleging intentional injury.
The facts of Gray v. Zurich fit the pattern described above. Dr.
Gray was sued for assault and battery in Missouri. His version of the
incident was as follows:
Immediately preceding the altercation Dr. Gray had been driving
an automobile on a residential street when another automobile
narrowly missed colliding with his car. Jones, the driver of the
other car, left his vehicle, approaching Dr. Gray's car in a menacing
manner and jerked open the door. At that point Dr. Gray, fearing
physical harm to himself and his passengers, rose from his seat and
struck Jones. 64
Dr. Gray tendered the defense of the Jones suit to his insurance
carrier, which refused to defend him. He then unsuccessfully de-
fended on the theory of self-defense and suffered judgment in the
amount of $6,000 compensatory damages.
In holding that the carrier had wrongfully refused to defend Dr.
Gray, the court pointed to the impossibility of determining, at the
outset, whether coverage was available or not:
Although insurers have often insisted that the duty arises only if
the insurer is bound to indemnify the insured, this very contention
creates a dilemma. No one can determine whether the third party
suit does or does not fall within the indemnification coverage of the
policy until that suit is resolved; in the instant case, the determination
of whether the insured engaged in intentional, negligent or even
wrongful conduct depended upon the judgment in the Jones suit,
and indeed, even after that judgment, no one could be positive
whether it rested upon a finding of plaintiff's negligent or his inten-
tional conduct. The carrier's obligation to indemnify inevitably
will not be defined until the adjudication of the very action which
it should have defended. 65
A second major argument used by the court in favor of a duty to
defend was based on the language of the defense clause, which, "in
its broad sweep would lead the insured reasonably to expect defense
of any suit regardless of merit or cause."66  The court found the
relation of the defense clause to the intentional injuries exclusion
uncertain and ambiguous. In view of the uncertainty, the court
held that the policy should be construed in favor of the insured.
62 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966).
63 E.g., Knepper, Insurer's Duty To Defend: Recent Developments, 17
DEFENSE L.J. 391 (1968); cf. Note, The Insurer's Duty To Defend Made Ab-
solute: Gray v. Zurich, 14 U.C.L.A.L. R.v. 1328 (1967).
64 Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 267 n.1, 419 P.2d 168, 170
n.1, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 106 n.1 (1966).
65 Id. at 271-72, 419 P.2d at 173, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 109.
66 Id. at 273, 419 P.2d at 174, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 110.
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Another basis for the decision in Gray v. Zurich was a line of
earlier decisions holding that a suit must be defended if it "po-
tentially seeks damages within the coverage of the policy.167 Plead-
ings are likely to exaggerate or distort facts and are, under modern
procedure, lacking in allegations of specific facts and readily subject
to amendment. The court in Gray v. Zurich noted that
the complainant in the third party action drafts his complaint in the
broadest terms; he may very well stretch the action which lies in
only nonintentional conduct to the dramatic complaint that alleges
intentional misconduct. In the light of the likely overstatement of
the complaint and of the plasticity of modern pleading, we should
hardly designate the third party as the arbiter of the policy's
coverage. 6S
The possibility that a complaint alleging intentional conduct
may be amended to allege something else furnishes the plaintiff with
an ever present opportunity to change his theory once the lawsuit has
begun, even if he has confined his initial pleading to an intentional
tort theory and has not included an alternative claim for negligence.
A claimant, as a practical matter, always has the option of proceeding
on a negligence theory even if there is some evidence of intended
harm. The court in Gray v. Zurich was thus concerned to give the de-
fendant the same latitude with regard to the defense clause of his
policy as that possessed by the plaintiff in selecting a theory of re-
covery. In so doing it opted for an interpretation of the defense
clause stressing the undertaking to defend all suits for bodily injury
or property damage, including those which are "groundless, false or
fraudulent," 69 and suppressing the limitation to claims "damages for
which are payable under the terms of this endorsement.170 Such a
choice is compelled by the terms of the defense clause in cases where
intentional harm is alleged.
Although it has not been universally applauded, the decision in
Gray v. Zurich has at least clarified the scope of the duty to defend.
It provides a broad, workable rule and, in jurisdictions where the
decision is followed, it should virtually guarantee that persons
owning liability policies will be entitled to defense against allegations
of intentional tort, so long as the claim is of a nature covered by the
policy. Circumstances should be rare in which the claim will not in-
clude the possibility that the insured's mental state in fact fell short
of the specific intent to inflict the harm upon which the claim is based.
One factual situation not dealt with in Gray v. Zurich is that
in which the insured admits that he intended to cause harm. If he
67 Id. at 275, 419 P.2d at 176, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 112 (emphasis by the
court).
68 Id. at 276, 419 P.2d at 176, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 112.
69 Id. at 274, 419 P.2d at 173, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 109.
70 Id.
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admits that he intended to cause all of the harm involved in the
claim there would, presumably, be no duty to defend, as long as the
insured's admission excludes any possibility that the claim might fall
within the language of the policy. But such an admission is, of course,
highly unlikely. In the usual case the insured admits that he in-
tended some harm, but denies that he intended all of the harm re-
sulting.
The latter situation arose in Weis v. State Farm Mutual Auto-
mobile Insurance Company,71 in which the insured, when initially
contacted by an adjuster from his carrier, described the accident as
"the famous bumping case,"72 and admitted that he had "deliberately
bumped into the back of [the claimant's] car several times. '73  The
court held that the insurer was not obligated to defend a bodily in-
jury suit resulting from the bumping on the argument that the in-
sured had admitted that there had been no "accident." As with some
of the decisions cited in the previous section,74 the Weis opinion is
deficient in failing to analyze the factual issue actually presented.
The court based its argument that no accident had occurred on the
assertion that "the incidents complained of were not accidents but
intentional and deliberate acts on his part."75 As noted above, the
policy does not exclude coverage for "intentional acts," but rather
excludes coverage for intentional injury.76 The question whether
the insured had in fact intended bodily injury was not discussed, al-
though it would appear from the opinion that no such harm was in-
tended. The case is thus one where rthe insured intended to cause far
less harm than that which ultimately resulted. The injury, viewed
as a whole, is the result of aggravated negligence rather than intent.
A similar, and more difficult case to resolve, is Stout v. Grain
Dealers Mutual Insurance Company77 Female members of the in-
sured's family- had been bothered by a Peeping Tom. The insured
rigged a warning device and when the device revealed the Peeping
Tom, the insured gave chase. He fired about 15 shots from a .22
caliber rifle, two of which struck the Peeping Tom and resulted in his
death. In the resulting prosecution the insured pleaded guilty to
71 242 Minn. 141, 64 N.W.2d 366 (1954).
72 Id. at 142, 64 N.W.2d at 367.
73 Id. at 145, 64 N.W.2d at 368.
74 Kraus v. Allstate Ins. Co., 258 F. Supp. 407 (D. Pa.), af'd, 379 F.2d
443 (3d Cir. 1966); Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Ratliff, 242 F. Supp. 983 (E.D. Ark.
1965); Wigginton v. Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co., 169 So. 2d 170 (La. App. 1964).
75 Weis v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 242 Mnn. 141, 145, 64 N.W.2d
366, 368 (1954).
76 STANDARD LIABILITY PoLicy or 1935, supra note 1.
77 307 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1962).
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voluntary manslaughter. The insured tendered the defense of a civil
suit by the Peeping Tom's heirs to the carrier which had issued his
homeowner's policy and the tender was refused. The court upheld
the refusal to defend, holding that the plea to the criminal charge
was a binding admission of an intent to kill, thus defeating any possi-
bility of coverage. The insured's position was that he had entered
the plea in order to avoid the possibility of a prison sentence and
that he had not acted with a specific intent to kill.
It is submitted that even under the facts in Stout the insured
was entitled to a defense, if one accepts the policy interpretation
advanced in Gray v. Zurich. The insured's plea was not res judicata78
on the issue of intent to kill and the explanation he later gave for
its entry was reasonable in the light of the circumstances. The lia-
bility, if any, to the heirs of the Peeping Tom would not necessarily
depend on such an intent. The insured might have been liable on a
theory of use of excessive force in defense of his family or of recklessly
firing to frighten away the intruder, neither of which would neces-
sarily involve the intent to kill or even inflict serious injury. The
case is really one in which the issue of coverage cannot be determined
except by a separate proceeding inquiring into the intent of the in-
sured. It is thus one in which a duty to defend should arise.
Much litigation concerning the duty to defend claims alleging
intentional torts has been generated by an attitude formerly preva-
lent in the insurance industry of refusing to defend such claims. It has
been the writers' experience that this resistance to an expansive inter-
pretation of the defense clause had its origin in the belief that the
cost of defense in such cases was not included in the computation of
the premium. The trend in judicial decisions toward upholding the
duty to defend intentional tort claims has altered this attitude and
78 In Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 601, 375
P.2d 439, 25 Cal. Rptr. 559 (1962), the court held that a conviction was col-
lateral estoppel on the issue of participation by the insured in a theft, cover-
age for which was claimed under a policy. The court remarked that the
case would be different if a guilty plea were involved: "A plea of guilty is
admissible in a subsequent civil action on the independent ground that it is
an admission. It would not serve the policy underlying collateral estoppel,
however, to make the plea conclusive.... When a plea of guilty has been
entered in the prior action, no issues have been 'drawn into controversy' by a
'full presentation' of the case. It may reflect only a compromise or a belief
that paying a fine is more advantageous than litigation. Consideration of
fairness to civil litigants and regard for the expeditious administration of
criminal justice ... combine to prohibit the application of collateral estoppel
against a party who, having pleaded guilty to a criminal charge, seeks for the
first time to litigate his cause in a civil action." Id. at 605-06, 375 P.2d at 441,
25 Cal. Rptr. at 561. See also Gillespie v. Modern Woodmen of America, 101
W. Va. 602, 133 S.E. 333 (1926).
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has caused many companies to collect a premium for the cost of such
defense and to accept the tender of defense in such actions. The
effect of this new attitude in the industry, where it exists, is to afford
the insured a defense, postponing the potential dispute over coverage
until the claim has been resolved. Where this approach is adopted
by the industry the public is undoubtedly better served.
As the court pointed out in Gray v. Zurich, if the insured is af-
forded a defense against a claim based on an intentional tort, he has as
much protection as he might reasonably be led to expect by the lan-
guage of the policy. In those cases where the allegations of inten-
tional wrongdoing are exaggerations, he is not denied the protection
of his insurance by a false statement of the facts upon which the
claim is predicated. Imposing the duty to defend in such situations
is thus in the best interest of the insured and is not in conflict with
the concept held by many insurers of their duties under the defense
clause. It is hoped that the approach furnished by Gray v. Zurich
will be adopted in other jurisdictions and a general recognition will
develop that a person insured under a liability policy is entitled to a
defense under the policy regardless of whether the claim is initially
predicated upon negligence or intentional wrongdoing.
H. Coverage For Intentional Torts Under Recently
Developed Policy Forms
A. Amendments in the Standard Policy
In 1966 new standard policy forms were introduced, altering the
accident and intentional injury clauses of the liability insurance pol-
icy.79 The language of the new forms clarifies, but does not sub-
stantially alter, the scope of coverage afforded for intentional tort
liability in the commonly marketed forms of liability insurance, such
as automobile, comprehensive, homeowner's, and owner's, landlord's
and tenant's. The new standard liability policy was drafted with the
objective of eliminating the ambiguities found in the old policy as a
result of the use there of the unqualified term "accident." The
applicability of the policy to the intentional conduct of the insured
is also stated in a more lucid manner by eliminating the intentional
injury exclusion, which was buried in the middle of a long list of
exclusions toward the end of the old policy. In place of the intentional
injury exclusion the new policy contains a clause related directly to
the language of the insuring agreement.
The central clause of the insuring agreement of the new policy
reads: "The company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums
which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages
79 STANDARD LIABmLITY POLICY OF 1966, supra note 1.
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because of .. .bodily injury or ... property damage to which this
insurance applies, caused by an occurrence .... ,"80 In the "Defini-
tion" section it is stated that: "'occurrence' means an accident, in-
cluding injurious exposure to conditions which results during the
policy period in bodily injury or property damage neither expected
nor intended from the standpoint of the insured."81
By replacing the term "accident" with that of "occurrence," and
by supplying the definition quoted above, the new policy seeks to
eliminate the two major ambiguities noted earlier which were gen-
erated by the use of the term "accident. '8 2 The "exposure to con-
ditions" qualification clarifies the issue of whether an accident must
happen "suddenly" or whether it may result from gradual processes.
The definition further specifies that the loss must be "neither ex-
pected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured," thus solving
the problem of whether "accident" should be viewed from the position
of the insured or the injured party.8 3
Like the exclusion in the former policy, the new definition of
"occurrence" focuses on the intent to injure rather than on the intent
to act. Damages resulting from an intentional act, and even from
an act committed with the intent to harm, are covered, so long as
the damage actually resulting was neither "intended nor expected"
by the insured. The new policy thus represents no major change in
the scope of the coverage, but rather an effort to carry forward the
philosophy of the old policy in a more intelligible verbal framework.
The same issues of coverage raised by the older forms are still present.
Another change in the language of the insuring agreement of the
new policy is the addition of "expected" to the phrase which deals
with intent. What one expects and what one intends can be two
widely different things; however, the use of the word "expected" in
the new policy must have been designed as an effort to specify the
traditional distinction drawn in liability underwriting between harm
brought about by the design of the insured and harm for which he is
liable but which he did not contemplate.
It is difficult to foresee at this time any major alteration in the
scope of coverage resulting from the addition of the word "expected."
It can be foreseen, however, that the term may generate dispute as
to whether there is coverage in cases in which the insured foresees a
80 Id. Essentially the same language appears in several other standard
insurance policies issued by the National Board of Casualty Underwriters:
The comprehensive general form, the owners', landlords' and tenants' form,
the manufacturers' and contractors' form, the completed operations and prod-
ucts liability form, the contractual liability form, and the garage form.
81 STANDARD LIABILITY POLICY OF 1966, supra note 1.
82 See text accompanying notes 10-13 supra.
83 See text accompanying note 11 supra.
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hazard and fails to prevent it, or where he commits an act the con-
sequences of which any man would have anticipated, although he
may deny having intended them. The former situation, as where the
insured sees the claimant on the railroad track and does not warn him
of the approaching train, is the type of conduct usually treated as
negligence and should be covered. The latter, exemplified by the
man who fires a gun into a crowd, falls more appropriately into what
has traditionally been regarded as intended harm. The presence of
"expected" in the policy might thus have some impact on cases such
as Kraus v. Allstate Insurance Company,84 where the insured, in set-
ting off dynamite in a public area, may not have intended to injure
bystanders, but surely could be held to have expected such a conse-
quence.
B. Personal Injury Liability Insurance
Far more significant than the language change in the standard
policy is the recent introduction of new forms of insurance on a
general basis covering certain specific intentional torts. The new
coverage is not confined to those damages resulting from "bodily in-
jury or property damage." Rather, a new concept-"personal in-
jury"-is introduced to deal with those wrongs which involve neither
one's body nor his property. The new coverage does not invariably
attempt to exclude harm intended by the insured. In some policy
forms the concept of accidental injury has been abolished altogether
and coverage is afforded for some torts regardless of the mental state
of the insured.
The insurance industry has for many years written coverage for
torts such as defamation, invasion of privacy, false arrest and malicious
prosecution on non-standard forms and in what are called "non-ad-
mitted markets," that is, on an extremely selective basis. The new
forms of coverage discussed herein were not invented overnight.
The new development consists, rather, of a trend toward the stand-
ardization of policy forms and the availability of such coverage to
commercial enterprises. The ordinary business establishment may
today be covered for libel and slander, whereas such coverage would
have been very unusual a decade ago.
While "personal injury" insurance forms are not yet as fully
standardized as is the usual liability policy, most of the variations
are minor.8 5 The National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters has
drafted a standard endorsement for use in connection with general
84 258 F. Supp. 407 (D. Pa. 1966).
85 Some policies exclude all harm intended by the insured; some include
racial discrimination as a scheduled risk. Of the policies examined, these were
the major variations from the standard endorsement.
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liability policies.8 6 This endorsement includes the basic features of
all personal injury coverage now available and will probably be the
model for policy forms in the future.
The provisions of the standard personal injury endorsement are
as follows:
The Company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the
insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because
of injury (herein called "personal injury") sustained by any person
or organization and arising out of one or more of the following
offenses:
Group A-false arrest, detention or imprisonment, or malicious pros-
ecution.
Group B-the publication or utterance of libel or slander or of other
defamatory or disparaging material, or a publication or
utterance in violation of an individual's right of privacy ....
Group C-wrongful entry or eviction, or other invasion of the right
of private occupancy .... 87
The endorsement also contains two exclusions concerning the
impact of the mental state of the insured upon coverage. Utterances
described in Group B are excluded if "made by or at the direction of
any insured with knowledge of the falsity thereof."8 " The endorse-
ment also excludes coverage of "personal injury arising out of the
willful violation of a penal statute or ordinance committed by or with
the knowledge or consent of any insured."8 9
The two most important features of the endorsement are the un-
restricted use of the term "injury" and the absence of any require-
ment that the loss be "caused by an occurrence." Thus, coverage is
afforded for any injury arising out of one of the scheduled torts, 0 un-
doubtedly extending to all forms of general and special damages
normally recoverable in actions predicated on these torts. The lan-
guage is also sufficiently broad to extend coverage to liability for
punitive damages and, in some cases, to harm inflicted intentionally
by the insured. There is no effort to provide for a general exclu-
sion of such harm, and the only circumstances under which it would
be excluded by the terms of the policy are, therefore, those provided
for in the exclusions referred to in the preceding paragraph.
The personal injury endorsement represents an innovation in one
respect merely in seeking to insure many of the torts described. Tt
presents a far more significant innovation, however, in attempting to
furnish coverage under some circumstances for harm inflicted in-
86 NATIONAL BUREAU OF CASUALTY UNDERRITERS, STANDARD GENERAL





90 Unless an exclusion applies.
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tentionally by the insured. This is not only a novel form of insur-
ance, but is also a form of insurance condemned in many sources as
contrary to public policyY1
The initial interpretive problem which the endorsement presents
is that of determining exactly those kinds of conduct which are in-
sured. Unlike most policies, the endorsement seeks to restrict cover-
age by reference to various theories of recovery. The chief difficulty
with this format is that there are bases for tort liability which are
not listed in the endorsement but which involve conduct similar to that
found in the torts which are listed. For example, in connection with
the coverage afforded for malicious prosecution, the question may
arise whether the kindred tort of abuse of process is also included.
Malicious prosecution usually involves the unjustifiable instigation of
criminal proceedings,92 but the bringing of a civil action out of
malicious motives is also tortious 3 Abuse of process is the malicious
prosecution of certain civil remedies such as attachment and injunc-
tion.94 If one looks beyond the label of the action, abuse of process
ought to be covered by the endorsement. Other examples may be the
"injurious falsehood" torts, which might be covered under Group B
of the endorsement,95 and a broad range of wrongs under the general
91 9 G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAw § 39:15 (2d ed. R. Ander-
son 1962).
92 See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 113
(3d ed. 1964).
93 Stevens v. Chisholm, 179 Cal. 557, 178 P. 128 (1919); Eastin v. Bank of
Stockton, 66 Cal. 123, 4 P. 1106 (1884).
94 Pimentel v. Houk, 101 Cal. App. 2d 884, 887, 226 P.2d 739, 741 (1951).
95 The reference in Group B to the utterance of "disparaging material"
in connection with libel and slander raises the question of whether torts
sometimes called "trade libel" and "slander of title" are also covered. The
Restatement categorizes these under the heading of "Disparagement" and de-
fines them as the invasion of the interest in the vendibility of property.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 624 (1938). Some text writers have employed the
broader term "injurious falsehood" to characterize a whole class of unusual
actions, all predicated on the utterances of falsehoods which are not defama-
tory to the personality of the plaintiff but which may cause pecuniary damage.
E.g., W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 938-50 (3d ed. 1964). These
actions may include disparaging the quality of the plaintiff's goods, the in-
tegrity of his employees, or the nature of his business. Id. at 943. They are
not, strictly speaking, "personal injuries," but nothing in the endorsement
would require that "personal injury" be interpreted in a manner restricting
coverage. The general reference to "other defamatory or disparaging ma-
terial" in fact appears to create coverage for a wide range of economic in-
juries. For example, the plaintiff may allege that the defendant circulated a
false rumor that he is a malingerer, thus preventing him from obtaining em-
ployment. This could be actionable defamation, but it is also an interference
with a prospective advantage, and could be actionable on that distinct theory
of recovery. Similarly, inducing a third person to breach a contract with the
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heading of "invasion of the right of private occupancy," which might
be covered under Group C.O
While it would appear that such actions should be included within
the scope of coverage of the endorsement, it is arguable that such
coverage was not intended; the question has not yet been decided.
A larger question is whether the endorsement would cover an award
of punitive damages, and if so, whether such coverage would be con-
trary to the public policy of the state.
1. Coverage For Punitive Damages97
As noted above, the insuring agreement of the personal injury en-
dorsement obligates the insurer to "pay on behalf of the insured all
sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay be-
cause of injury (herein called 'personal injury'). "s8 The literal read-
ing of this language would indicate that punitive as well as compensa-
tory damages are covered. The obligation extends to "all sums,"
regardless of the technical form of the damages assessed. There is
no language anywhere in the endorsement, or indeed in most liability
insurance policies, which would expressly exclude from coverage the
obligation to pay punitive damages.
No California decision has yet determined whether an. insurer is
obligated to pay an award assessed against its insured for punitive
damages. In other jurisdictions, some courts have held that the ob-
ject of punitive damages, the punishment of the offender, would be
frustrated if the penalty could be shifted to an insurance company
and have thus held that insurance for punitive damages would be
contrary to public policy.99 Other courts have held that punitive
plaintiff, Imperial Ice Co. v. Rossier, 18 Cal. 2d 33, 112 P.2d 631 (1941), pro-
curing his wrongful discharge from employment, Blender v. Superior Court,
55 Cal. App. 2d 24, 130 P.2d 179 (1942), stealing his customers, Elsbach v.
Mulligan, 58 Cal. App. 2d 354, 136 P.2d 651 (1943), or his trade secrets, Riess
v. Sanford, 42 Cal. App. 2d 244, 117 P.2d 694 (1941), all may involve defama-
tory or disparaging utterances or the publication of rrivate information, al-
though the remedial action most appropriately suited to the facts may be one
of the torts developed for the protection of economic interests, not mentioned
by exrress reference in Group B.
06 Thus coverage is afforded for interference with possession and enjoy-
ment by means such as noise, leaky roofs, obstruction of access, obnoxious
fumes, and others, actionable on a variety of theories such as breach of a
lease, nuisance or trespass.
97 See Long, Insurance Protection Against Punitive Damages, 32 TENN.
L. REV. 573 (1965); Comment, Liability Insurance and Assault and Battery:
Coverage and Damages Problems, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 506 (1965); 15 ALA. L. REV.
614 (1963).
98 See text accompanying note 87 supra.
09 Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962)
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damages are insurable, 10 0 and at least one court has held that the
insurer is liable for punitive damages on the argument that the policy
speaks of a requirement to pay "all sums which the insured becomes
obligated to pay," regardless of the nature of the liability.10 1 Where
the judgment against the insured has been for compensatory and
punitive damages in an unsegregated amount, there is authority for
allowing coverage of the entire sum, no means of apportionment
being available. 102 There is also a problem of whether double and
treble damages are truly punitive in nature and thus subject to the
argument that punishment is being shifted to the insurer.
03
The course of California law in this area is difficult to predict,
in view of the variety of holdings in other jurisdictions. Arguably,
statutes such as Civil Code section 1668,104 which purports to invali-
date contracts exempting a person from responsibility for "willful in-
jury," and Insurance Code section 533,105 exonerating the insurer from
liability for losses caused by the "wilful act" of the insured, would
preclude coverage if the "malice" generally required by section 3294
of the Civil Code'0 6 for the recovery of punitive damages is the
equivalent of the "willful injury" or "wilful act" referred to by the
statutes. Judicial interpretations of the term "wilful" in connection
with Insurance Code section 533 seem to indicate that it means an act
committed with the specific intent to harm.1'0 7 On the other hand,
(Florida law); Nicholson v. American Fire & Cas. Co., 177 So. 2d 52 (Fla.
App. 1965).
100 Maryland Cas. Co. v. Baker, 200 S.W.2d 757 (Ky. 1947); Wolff v.
General Cas. Co., 68 N.M. 292, 361 P.2d 330 (1961); Carroway v. Johnson,
245 S.C. 200, 139 S.E.2d 908 (1965).
101 Morrell v. Lalonde, 45 R.I. 112, 120 A. 435 (1923).
102 Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers' Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Thorn-
ton, 244 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1957).
103 Tedesco v. Maryland Cas. Co., 127 Conn. 533, 18 A.2d 357 (1941)
(denying coverage). In some jurisdictions, notably Alabama, damages for
wrongful death are treated as punitive; they have nonetheless been held in-
surable. American Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Werfel, 230 Ala. 552, 162 So. 103
(1935).
104 "All contracts which have for their object, directly or indirectly,
to exempt anyone from responsibility for his own fraud, or willful injury to
the person or property of another, or violation of law, whether willful or
negligent, are against the policy of the law." CAL. Civ. CODE § 1668.
105 "An insurer is not liable for a loss caused by the wilful act of the
insured; but he is not exonerated by the negligence of the insured, or of the
insured's agents or others." CAL. INS. CoDE § 533.
106 "In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from con-
tract, where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice,
express or implied, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may re-
cover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the de-
fendant." CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294.
107 Walters v. American Ins. Co., 185 Cal. App. 2d 776, 8 Cal. Rptr. 665
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cases interpreting Civil Code section 3294 have indicated that "malice"
as used in that statute is broader in meaning, and that it may refer
to an act "so unreasonable and dangerous that [the defendant]
knew or should have known that it was highly probable that harm
would result."10 8  In one case, the court observed: "The courts of
this state have long recognized that punitive damages are recover-
able for an area of tortious conduct more culpable than negligence,
but falling short of intentional conduct."10 9 If conduct falling short
of "willful" behavior can give rise to liability for punitive damages,
the rule of public policy against insurance for such damages rpust
originate in some source other than the Insurance and Civil Code
sections quoted. Such a rule does not now exist in California, and
if developed, of necessity it will be through new legislation or through
judge-made public policy.
The Exclusions
The personal injury endorsement first excludes utterances under
Group B "made by or at the direction of any insured with knowledge
of the falsity thereof."' 10 As this language is clear and succinct, no
special problems are expected to arise from this exclusion.
The endorsement also states, however, that the insurance does not
cover personal injury "arising out of the willful violation of a penal
statute or ordinance committed by or with the knowledge or consent
of any insured."' This clause removes from the coverage otherwise
afforded a wide range of intended harm. Several interpretive prob-
lems are presented by his exclusion.
a. Only a "Violation" of a Penal Statute or Ordinance is Required
to Defeat Coverage
Although the intent of the draftsman might have been expressed
more clearly, it would appear that a conviction is not required to
bring the exclusion into effect, and that the insurer would be justified
in denying coverage on the basis of a "violation" whether or not a
prosecution and conviction resulted from the alleged criminal act.
However, the question whether a violation was committed could not,
(1960); Russ-Feld Corp. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, 164 Cal. App. 2d 83, 330
P.2d 432 (1958).
108 E.g., Sturges v. Charles L. Harney, Inc., 165 Cal. App. 2d 306, 320,
331 P.2d 1072, 1080 (1958). The court held that an instruction containing the
quoted language "did not constitute prejudicial error." Id. at 322, 331 P.2d
at 1081.
109 Id. at 322, 331 P.2d at 1081.
110 STANDARD GENERAL LarAxny PoLIcY, supra note 86.
111 Id.
May 1969] INTENTIONAL TORT INSURANCE
in most cases, be resolved prior to the conclusion of the criminal
prosecution. In the absence of such a prosecution, it could not be
resolved without a declaratory relief suit. The insurer would there-
fore be required to defend claims arising out of alleged violations
of penal statutes until such time as it might be finally adjudicated
that a violation in fact occurred. Consequently, the penal statute
exclusion may have little impact on the insurer's duty to defend,
except in cases in which the insured is promptly convicted of a
violation.
b. The Endorsement Requires a 'Willful Violation"
The inherent ambiguity of the term "willful" creates many prob-
lems, as the term possesses differing meanings in different areas of
the law. In California criminal law, the term usually means simply
"a purpose or willingness to commit the act, or make the omission
referred to. It does not require any intent to violate law, or to injure
another or to acquire any advantage. 11 2 Hence, a criminal intent is
not necessarily involved in a crime committed "willfully." Many
crimes may be willful (e.g., traffic offenses) although a guilty state of
mind or mens rea is not required.1
3
On the other hand "willful" is used in connection with certain
true crimes, that is, those requiring a guilty state of mind, such as
"willfully and lewdly" selling an obscene book. 1 4 Such examples
indicate that the term is essentially meaningless and that it can be
interpreted to signify whatever culpability requirement seems most
appropriate under the circumstances. In view of the breadth which
this exclusion would achieve if the nonculpable meaning of "willful"
were applied to the policy, it is believed that the term, as used in the
personal injury endorsement, should be construed to imply a criminal
intent. It is readily arguable that by its use, the draftsman of the
endorsement intended to make a distinction between the so-called
"true crimes" and those minor offenses such as traffic violations in
which no culpable state of mind is required.
c. Interpretation Problems Could Be Raised by the Use of "Penal
Statute or Ordinance"
This phrase could be interpreted to include every law for which
criminal-type sanctions are imposed. It is more likely, however, as in
112 CAL. PEN. CODE § 7. The term is not even spelled consistently in
California Statutes. E.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 4553 ("serious and willful mis-
conduct").
113 R. PERKINS, CRInmATAL LAW 688 (1957).
114 People v. Wepplo, 78 Cal. App. 2d 959, 178 P.2d 853 (1947); CAL. PEN.
CODE § 311.
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the case of the "willful" requirement, that it would be confined in
applicability to those acts punishable only when coupled with a crim-
inal intent. Public welfare offenses, punishable by fine but not truly
criminal in nature, such as motor vehicle violations, should not be
held to fall within the meaning of this language of the exclusion. If
all such offenses were included in the exclusion, it would be possible
to deny coverage in innumerable situations in which the act of the
insured happens to offend an obscure regulatory statute involving
a criminal-type penalty.
The penal statute exclusion .was obviously included in the policy
to obviate some of the objections based on public policy which have
been asserted in opposition to coverage for intended harm. The main
basis for the argument that such coverage should not be allowed is
that it would encourage wrongdoing. By excluding criminal offenses,
coverage is withdrawn by the endorsement from the more aggravated
forms of intended wrongdoing. Conflict with public policy is thus
minimized.
II. Public Policy Consideration in Insurance
for Intentional Torts
Decisions from many jurisdictions include statements to the effect
that insurance for "willful," "malicious" or "intended" harm would be
contrary to public policy. In some states this rule is of common law
origin.115 In California'1 6 and at least one other state," 7 it is said to
rest on a statute, originating in the Field Code, which passed un-
modified into the twentieth century. That coverage for intended
harm raises substantial issues of public policy can readily be demon-
strated. It has already been noted that in cases in which punitive
damages are recovered, the ability to shift the burden of liability to
an insurer would defeat the deterrent purpose of the award and
allow the wrongdoer to go unpunished."8 Thus, arguably, the law
should not allow such insurance, whatever the contract says about
the forms of liability that are insured.
A broader issue of public policy is raised concerning the advisa-
bility of insuring general damages recovered because of intentional
wrongdoing. Expressions of a public policy against insurance for
losses inflicted intentionally by the insured are usually justified by
reference to the assumption that such conduct would be encouraged
if insurance were available to shift the financial cost of the loss from
"5 Sheehan v. Goriansky, 321 Mass. 200, 72 N.E.2d 538 (1947); Hart-
ford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Wolbarst, 95 N.H. 40, 57 A.2d 151 (1948).
116 CAL. INS. CODE § 533.
"17 N.D. CENMr. CODE § 26-0604 (1960).
118 See text accompanying note 99 supra.
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the wrongdoer to his insurer. 119 Additionally, the rule has undoubt-
edly been motivated by moral considerations, although the morality
may be somewhat out of date. Exonerating the tortfeasor from the
cost of his wrong would not only encourage bad conduct, it Would
also save him from suffering financial cost. The punitive aspect of
tort law, more apparent a century ago than it is today, would be
nullified if such coverage were allowed.
. Unfortunately, -the rule of public policy disfavoring insurance
for intentional torts has been handed down for a century or more
with virtually no critical examination. Questions such as whether
all forms of intended harm are equally likely to be encouraged by
the availability of liability insurance to cover them and whether all
potential insureds would be equally subject to illegal temptation have
never been asked, much less answered. Rather the law has con-
tinued with a blanket rule against insuring any kind of intended
harm. That rule is now confronted by an insurance market in which
forms of the supposedly prohibited coverage are available to some
buyers, bringing up the question whether its purchasers have acquired
insurance, or merely participated in an illegal bargain.
The inclination of courts to allude to this rule without giving
thought to its implications is a result of the fact that public policy
rarely has any effect on the outcome of decisions involving coverage
for intentional torts. Most liability insurance policies contain lan-
guage excluding from coverage those injuries intentionally inflicted
by the insured. If the court has before it such a contract of insur-
ance, the reason for denying coverage for intended harm is that the
contract does not provide for it. To say that such a contract would be
illegal if it did so provide is a gratuitous afterthought, but such
gratuities provide virtually the entire body of law on the subject of
insurance for intentional wrongdoing.
The experience of California courts in applying section 533 of the
Insurance Code is typical of the evolution of a rule of law by way of
dicta. This statute has been held to codify a "general rule" of public
policy against insurance for intended harm.120 The conclusion that
section 533 deals with the illegality of contracts is less than inescap-
able. The statute provides that the insurer is "not liable for a loss
caused by the wilful act of the insured.' 21 Whether this was de-
signed to preclude the making of contracts covering such losses, or
whether it was merely a rule to apply in the interpretation of insur-
ance policies, most of which have never been drafted with the idea of
119 New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Jones, 135 F.2d 191, 193-94 (6th Cir. 1943).
120 Arenson v. National Auto. & Cas. Ins. Co., 45 Cal. 2d 81, 84, 286 P.2d
816, 818 (1955).
121 CAL. INS. COD- § 533.
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affording such coverage, is not clear from the language. As the stat-
ute says, an insurer is "not liable" for such a loss, but this is because
of the standard practice in the industry. The statute does not state
flatly that an insurer could not be liable for such a loss if it expressly
agreed to be. In any event, it is too late to argue the point. There
are already ample decisions making the statute an affirmative rule of
law dealing with what may and may not be insured.122 Common law
decisions also treat the question in terms of the legality of bargains,
although they too might show better reasoning if the rule were
treated as one of interpretation.
1 23
As noted above, the statute includes the grossly ambiguous term
"wilful." Efforts to explain exactly that mental state denoted by
the term have been less than successful. However, it is clear that the
statute is treated as dealing with intentionally inflicted harm, and
it has been held not to prohibit anything not already removed from
the scope of coverage by the intentional injury exclusion of the
standard policy.124 Thus, as with pronouncements on public policy
in general, the California rule against coverage for intended harm
rarely comes into conflict with coverage actually afforded by a policy.
Where such conflict has appeared, the cases have taken opposing
approaches. Some have tried to avoid the rule in order to uphold
coverage.125 In one instance it has been applied to defeat coverage
which would otherwise have been available.
1 26
Examples of judicial footwork to save the coverage are plentiful.
One court commented that section 533 is like an exclusion and thus
122 The earliest cases, all involving fire rather than liability policies,
are unclear as to whether the statute furnishes anything more than a rule of
construction. Rankin v. Amazon Ins. Co., 89 Cal. 203, 26 P. 872 (1891); Sierra
Milling, Smelting & Mining Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 76 Cal. 235, 18 P.
267 (1888); Trojan Mining Co. v. Fireman's Ins. Co., 67 Cal. 27, 7 P. 4 (1885).
The earliest assertion that the statute is a rule of public policy appears to be
in Arenson v. National Auto. & Cas. Ins. Co., 45 Cal. 2d 81, 84, 286 P.2d 816,
818 (1955). See also Abbott v. Western Nat'l Indem. Co., 165 Cal. App. 2d
302, 305, 331 P.2d 997, 999 (1958); Russ-Field Corp. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's,
164 Cal. App. 2d 83, 96, 330 P.2d 432, 439 (1958).
123 See, e.g., Kraus v. Allstate Ins. Co., 258 F. Supp. 407, 412-13 (W.D.
Pa. 1966), in which the court suggested that public policy would be violated
if coverage were allowed for the injuries resulting from the bomb blast.
124 See Abbott v. Western Nat'l Indem. Co., 165 Cal. App. 2d 302, 305,
331 P.2d 997, 999 (1958), where the court stated that the standard policy ex-
clusion would be required by section 533.
125 E.g., Tomerlin v. Canadian Indem. Co., 61 Cal. 2d 638, 394 P.2d 571,
39 Cal. Rptr. 731 (1964); Azevedo v. Abel, 264 A.C.A. 519, 70 Cal. Rptr. 731
(1968); Nuffer v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 236 Cal. App. 2d 348, 45 Cal.
Rptr. 918 (1965).
126 E.g., Maxon v. Security Ins. Co., 214 Cal. App. 2d 603, 29 Cal.
Rptr. 586 (1963).
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should be "construed strictly against the insurer and liberally in favor
of the insured."' 27 This is a peculiar statement concerning a statute
designed by its very terms to exonerate insurers, but it may be prefer-
able to allowing the statute to interfere with the intent of contracting
parties. Another court had no difficulty in holding that section 533
has been superseded by the Workmen's Compensation Act so that cov-
erage is available for an intentional injury inflicted by an employer
or an employee. 128 The decision is undoubtedly correct as a matter
of statutory interpretation and the court was thus not particularly
concerned with the dictates of public policy.
Perhaps the most nimble effort to dodge the statute is found in
Tomerlin v. Canadian Indemnity Company,129 in which the court held
the insurer estopped to deny coverage for a judgment recovered on a
theory of battery. The estoppel was based on representations made
by defense counsel hired by the insurer that coverage was available.
The court's argument was that "defendant's liability here does not
arise from a contract executed prior to plaintiff's wilful misconduct,
but from the estoppel which arose after it."'130 Thus, allowing coverage
would not "arouse an illegal temptation,"' 31 as it would had the cover-
age originated in the policy. The court's argument can readily be
faulted in logic, although the decision was obviously motivated by a
well intended desire to secure indemnification for an insured who
had gone along with the defense afforded under the policy and who
had been rather soundly defeated in the battery suit. If it is truly
illegal to sell insurance covering the intentional infliction of harm by
the insured, it is difficult to understand how it can be lawful to give
it away through representations made subsequent to the execution of
the contract. The estoppel is based on the argument that the insured
has been led to rely on the availability of coverage for battery; but
an insured who bargained for such a policy initially would be all the
more entitled to reliance, although under the theory adopted by the
court such reliance would receive no protection.
The one decision in which section 533 has been applied to defeat
coverage furnished by the policy is Maxon v. Security Insurance Com-
pany. 32 The insured in Maxon, a storekeeper, had purchased a policy
covering bodily injury arising out of "[tihe ownership, maintenance
or use of retail store premises, or operations necessary or incidental
127 Nuffer v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 236 Cal. App. 2d 349, 356, 45
Cal. Rptr. 918, 923 (1965).
128 Azevedo v. Abel, 264 A.C.A. 519, 522, 70 Cal. Rptr. 710, 713 (1968).
129 61 Cal. 2d 638, 394 P.2d 571, 39 Cal. Rptr. 731 (1964).
30 Id. at 648, 394 P.2d at 577, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 737.
131 Id. at 648, 394 P.2d at 578, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 738.
132 214 Cal. App. 2d 603, 29 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1963).
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thereto.'13 3 The policy contained a defense clause in standard form.
If it contained an intentional injury exclusion the opinion does not
refer to it. The insured filed a criminal complaint against one Beulah
Johnson, who thereupon sued the insured for malicious prosecution.
The insured tendered his defense to the carrier, was refused, and
successfully defended through his own counsel on the theory that no
malice had accompanied the filing of the complaint. The insured
then sued the insurer for his costs of defense. The court had no
difficulty in holding that the action by Beulah Johnson resulted from
an "accident," applying the rule which views the event from the
aspect of the person injured. The court further had no difficulty in
holding that by its terms the policy covered actions for malicious
prosecution. It went on to hold, however, that "respondent insurer
cannot under the public policy of this state indemnify the insured
against liability for his own willful wrong.'" 3 4  This result was
reached by equating the "malice" which Beulah Johnson would have
had to prove in order to recover on a theory of malicious prosecution
with the "wilful act" phrase of section 533. The court further held
that since the insurer could not have been compelled to indemnify the
insured had the insured lost the case, it was not obligated to defend
him.
The value of the court's holding on the duty to defend is doubtful
in the light of Gray v. Zurich Insurance Company, 35 decided three
years later, although the court in Gray v. Zurich cited Maxon in a
footnote without disapproval. 36 Assuming that liability for mali-
cious prosecution is uninsurable, the complaint still might be one
within the potential coverage of the policy. The complaint might, for
example, be amended to state a cause of action for defamation. Fur-
ther, the insured at all times maintained that the allegation of malice
was false and that he was not liable at all. The case seems to pre-
sent, in fact, precisely the type of situation dealt with in Gray v.
Zurich, where the insured is sued on a claim, which, if wholly true,
would at least in theory not be covered because of public policy and
section 533, but where his own version of the case includes a denial
of the very fact relied upon to defeat the coverage. The issue pre-
sented was really not the insurability of malicious prosecution, but
rather the duty to defend a claim against an insured based on ma-
licious prosecution. Section 533 it should be noted, does not speak of
defense, but rather of liability for loss. It is thus doubtful whether
it should apply to the facts of Maxon at all.1
7
133 Id. at 607, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 587.
134 Id. at 615, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 592.
135 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966).
136 Id. at 275, 419 P.2d at 176, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 112.
137 See Turner, Can a Plaintiff, by a False Allegation, Destroy Your
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Tomerlin and Maxon provide an interesting contrast. In Tom-
erlin, coverage was upheld for an assault and battery on a theory of
estoppel in spite of the court's concessions that the harm inflicted was
intentional, that it would not have been covered under the policy as
written, and that if the policy had purported to cover it, the coverage
would have been illegal. In Maxon, coverage was refused, even to the
extent of a defense, in spite of the fact that the policy clearly covered
the claim and the fact that the insured conclusively demonstrated
that he was not guilty of inflicting harm intentionally. The contrast
is all the more striking when it is asked whether the availability of
coverage for malicious prosecution would encourage merchants to file
criminal complaints out of improper motives to the same extent that
intentional injuries to the person would be encouraged by the avail-
ability to the general public of coverage for all forms of battery.
The temptation to commit physical violence that coverage for in-
tended harm might arouse is undoubtedly one of the major reasons
for the public policy rule. Even if the premise is accepted that the
incidence of battery would increase if it were commonly insured, it
does not necessarily follow that the class of person likely to purchase
coverage for malicious prosecution would similarly become more ag-
gressive once in possession of such coverage. Each situation ought
to be analyzed on its own facts, but the all inclusive formulation of
the rule precludes such analysis.
Consider two other problematical cases. In Arenson v. National
Automobile & Casualty Insurance Company,138 a parent was sued
under a special statute for damages caused by his child in setting fire
to school property. Both the parent and the child were insureds under
a comprehensive liability policy. The court held that public policy
would not prohibit coverage on the parent, since the loss did not re-
sult from his willful act. Quite possibly the result would have been
different had the question been whether the coverage could be af-
forded to the child. In Haser v. Maryland Casualty Company, 39 the
plaintiff, while a taxicab passenger, was raped by another passenger
with the assistance of the driver. Suit was filed against the driver
for the plaintiff's injuries. The court had no difficulty holding that
no coverage was available to satisfy a judgment against the driver on
the argument that the rape was not accidental, as viewed from the
aspect of the driver. This conclusion is undoubtedly correct as an
Insurance Coverage?, 39 L.A.B. BuLL. 149 (1964), in which the author is
sharply critical of the Maxon decision, arguing that persons such as police
officers, security guards, and institutional parties such as banks and loan com-
panies may have legitimate reasons for purchasing insurance against mali-
cious prosecution claims.
138 45 Cal. 2d 81, 286 P.2d 816 (1955).
139 78 N.D. 893, 53 N.W.2d 508 (1952).
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interpretation of the insurance contract, given the definition of "acci-
dent" applied by the court. The court went on to say that a North
Dakota statute140 identical to section 533 expresses a public policy
which would prohibit coverage for this injury.
The question which might be posed in connection with Arenson,
although it was not presented in the case itself, is whether public
policy should prohibit insurance for the intentional wrongdoings of a
child. Haser poses a question in the same vein: Should insurance
for intended wrongdoing be illegal where the insured is functioning
as a common carrier? To answer these questions requires that the
likelihood of encouraging tortious conduct be weighed against the
probability that accident victims, who would otherwise be presented
with a fund against which they could recover, will be deprived of
compensation.
What the foregoing cases illustrate is simply that the law is un-
selective. It makes no distinctions as to the various forms of in-
tentional wrongdoing and does not admit the possibility that some
torts might not be particularly encouraged if insurance were avail-
able for them. It also makes no distinctions as to the classes of per-
sons insured. Rather it assumes that anyone insured in any manner
for the consequences of his own intentional wrongdoing will be en-
couraged to engage in such wrongdoing. The availability of coverage
to selected insureds and for selected forms of intentional wrong-
doing indicates that neither the insurance purchaser nor the insurance
underwriter accepts these assumptions. The insurance industry has
begun to discriminate among various risks of intended wrongdoing, has
been able to establish a loss rate on some of these risks and to fix a
premium for covering them. In continuing to assert a broad rule of
public policy which would prohibit such selective coverage, the law
takes an archaic view of the insurance industry and resists a rational
approach to loss distribution.
IV. A New Approach
The development of rational criteria for deciding what coverage
should and should not be available for intended wrongdoing is not
an impossible task. The public policy rule probably originated in a
feeling that physical violence would be encouraged if it were insur-
able. The automobile "bump" case, four instances of which have been
cited in this article,141 is a common enough occurrence to give some
140 N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-0604 (1960).
141 Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Ratliff, 242 F. Supp. 983 (E.D. Ark. 1965);
Wigginton v. Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co., 169 So. 2d 110 (La. App. 1964); Weis
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 242 Minn. 141, 64 N.W.2d 366 (1954); Crull v.
Gelb, 382 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. App. 1964).
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support to the argument that persons would be more inclined to
commit such acts if they could be sure of insurance for the
consequences. Cases such as Stout v. Grain Dealers Mutual Insur-
ance Company,142 in which the insured shot the Peeping Tom, could be
pointed to in suggesting that many persons might be encouraged in
the use of excessive force to defend personal and property rights if
they could be sure of insurance protection. Some torts might be en-
couraged which the law has taken special pains to deter. Trespass to
timber can give rise to treble damages because of the ease with which
the wrong can be committed under a pretended mistake as to bound-
aries.143  The damage remedies of the anti-trust laws are similarly
structured to create a special deterrent.4 4  Insurance for such forms
of conduct might well lead to irresponsibility.
On the other hand, torts such as false arrest and malicious prose-
cution, which most commonly originate in the setting of the retail
store, might be influenced very little by the availability of insurance.
The conduct of the potential tortfeasor is more likely to be influ-
enced by the desire to maintain good customer relations than by the
insurability of his conduct. Outside the mass media, defamation and
invasion of privacy are relatively unusual, and it would seem very
difficult to demonstrate empirically that insurance would increase the
temptation to commit them. The validity of the entire assumption
that insurance would encourage intended wrongdoing becomes suspect
when one considers the experience of society with mass insurance
since the development of the automobile. Although a vast segment
of the adult population is now insured for negligence in the operation
of automobiles, no one has ever seriously argued that the availability
of coverage has encouraged negligence. Even if such encouragement
could be demonstrated, no one would seriously argue for the abolition
of automobile insurance. On the contrary, a trend toward broader
auto coverage and, perhaps, compulsory insurance, continues because
of the demand to secure better compensation for victims.
The question whether intentional wrongdoing would be encour-
aged by insurance may be not so much a matter of what is insured as
of who is insured. Obviously some persons are better risks than
others. Certain classes of persons can be isolated whose propensity
for intentional wrongdoing would not be measurably affected by the
availability of insurance. Obvious examples are the employees of
common carriers and other public service industries, whose behavior
the employer is likely to regulate carefully as a matter of company
image. The rule of public policy fails to recognize such distinctions
142 307 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1962).
143 CAL. Civ. CoDE § 3346.
144 15 U.S.C. § 15 (treble damages).
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and precludes coverage for good risks and bad risks alike, although
the insurance industry has shown itself well able to distinguish be-
tween them.
It can be argued that the insurance industry rather than the law
would be the most effective agency to regulate the sale of insurance
for intended wrongdoing. The fact that such insurance is legal does
not mean that it will be sold to everyone. Since the insured has it
within his power deliberately to bring about the loss for which cover-
age is afforded, no sensible insurer is likely to sell such coverage ex-
cept to an insured who is very unlikely to create such losses. Further,
the policy itelf can be and frequently is drafted in such a manner as
to deter the insured from committing the covered offenses. The most
familiar device for restraining the insured is to expose his own fi-
nances, along with those of the insurer, to liability for the loss.
Coinsurance provisions usually take the form of a deductible policy,
in which the insured must pay the initial cost of the liability up to a
stated amount, beyond which the insurer is liable up to the limits of
its policy. Another common form is the participating policy, in
which the insured participates in the cost of the loss along with the
insurer at a percentage stated in the policy. The standard personal
injury endorsement discussed above contains such a participation
clause.145 The public policy argument becomes highly specious when
applied to coverage requiring the insured to pay a substantial de-
ductible or percentage of participation.
Obviously, if the law is to accommodate the new forms of cover-
age now being written some changes must be made. Those juris-
dictions in which the public policy rule is of judicial origin should be
able to reexamine the doctrine without the aid of legislation. States
such as California having statutes proscribing coverage for intended
harm will require legislative action in order to bring about a sub-
stantial alteration in public policy. Such states are now faced with a
choice of leaving the law as it stands, of attempting to develop a
system for rational distinction between those forms of coverage which
might produce antisocial consequences and those which will not, or
of abandoning affirmative public policy altogether and letting the
insurance industry select the risks to be insured. The first alterna-
tive has many undesirable aspects. The existing law seems unre-
alistic in many instances. Further, many insureds are now pay-
145 "If a participation percentage is stated in the schedule for the in-
sured, the company shall not be liable for a greater proportion of any loss than
the difference between such percentage and one hundred per cent, and the
balance of the loss shall be borne by the insured; provided, the company may
pay the insured's portion of a loss to effect settlement of the loss, and, upon
notification of the action taken, the named insured shall promptly reimburse
the company therefor." STAn-Dnm GEmR LiABH.ITY PoLicy, supra note 86.
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ing a premium for personal injury coverage written on forms sim-
ilar to the standard endorsement which do not contain a blanket
exclusion of intended harm. Enforcement of the rule against such
insureds will produce results like that in Maxon v. Security Insurance
Company,146 in situations where the insured purchases a policy,
the terms of which cover certain losses, only to be told that such
coverage is illegal once he has incurred a claim. Restitution of the
premium may seem a highly inadequate remedy to such an insured
against whom a claimant has recovered a judgment. Of the two
remaining alternatives, most observers would undoubtedly conclude
that some legislative regulation is preferable to abandoning the matter
wholly to the insurance industry. Such a conclusion is undoubtedly
appropriate in light of the involvement of coverage for punitive dam-
ages in the problem and the possible merit to the argument that
physical violence might be encouraged if intended harm coverage
were sold on a mass basis. The fact that insurers tend to avoid bad
risks may not be sufficient to quiet such doubts.
The most satisfactory solution would thus seem to be legislative
action. Such action would necessarily have to be predicated on a
thorough investigation to determine what forms of conduct really
ought to be uninsurable. As a rough outline of the possible new legis-
lation, it might be suggested that coverage be prohibited for all forms
of civil damages intended to deter the wrongdoer rather than com-
pensate the victim, including punitive or exemplary damages and
such analogous devices as double or treble damages. Coverage for
the intentional infliction of bodily injury has always been avoided
by insurers and is the form of coverage which comes to mind most
readily as an encouragement to wrongdoing. Beyond these sug-
gestions the appropriate rule to be applied is unclear. The central
problem is selecting whom to insure. Altering the law involves both a
decision as to the extent to which insurers may make the selection and
the formulation of some rule of public policy regarding those to be
selected. The problem will require more discussion and analysis
than it has received to date before such doubts can be resolved.
146 214 Cal. App. 2d 603, 29 Cal. Rptr. 568 (1963).
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